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I.

INTRODUCTION

Police officers killed George Floyd on May 25, 2020, resulting in
unprecedented worldwide protests against police brutality.1 George Floyd’s fatal
encounter with the police began when a store clerk reported George Floyd’s use of
a counterfeit twenty dollar bill.2 Officers arrived and handcuffed George Floyd—
a black man—pinning him to the ground.3 Derek Chauvin, a Minneapolis police
officer, then held his knee on George Floyd’s neck for nine and a half minutes,
ultimately killing George Floyd.4
George Floyd’s death generated public outcry across the nation regarding the
police’s use of excessive force.5 Bystanders recorded the chilling manner in which
Derek Chauvin killed George Floyd, and the videos quickly spread online.6 The
videos of the killing allowed viewers to see the devastating effects of police
brutality with their own eyes.7 Once people across the country—and the world—
saw the video, people gathered in protest, calling for change.8
One of the calls for change involves greater transparency of law enforcement
agencies.9 Today, many Americans feel there is a lack of transparency and
accountability with regards to law enforcement agencies and officer misconduct. 10
1. See Audra D.S. Burch et al., The Death of George Floyd Reignited a Movement. What Happens Now?,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/20/us/george-floyd-protests-police-reform.html
(on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (“[P]rotests . . . bec[ame] the largest mass protest
movement in U.S. history.”).
2. Tim Arango et al., How George Floyd Died, and What Happened Next, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/article/george-floyd.html (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
3. Id.
4. Janelle Griffith, Derek Chauvin Sentenced to 22.5 Years for the Murder of George Floyd, NBC NEWS
(June 25, 2021), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/derek-chauvin-be-sentenced-murder-death-georgefloyd-n1272332 (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
5. Megan Brenan, Amid Pandemic, Confidence in Key U.S. Institutions Surges, GALLUP NEWS (Aug. 12,
2020), https://news.gallup.com/poll/317135/amid-pandemic-confidence-key-institutions-surges.aspx (on file
with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
6. Griffith, supra note 4.
7. See Jeannie Suk Gersen, The Vital Role of Bystanders in Convicting Derek Chauvin, NEW YORKER (Apr.
21, 2021), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/the-vital-role-of-bystanders-in-convicting-derekchauvin, (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (declaring the critical role of the bystander’s
video and how it allowed the jury to see what unfolded during George Floyd’s killing with their own eyes).
8. See History.com Editors, George Floyd is Killed by a Police Officer, Igniting Historic Protests, HISTORY
(May 24, 2021) https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/george-floyd-killed-by-police-officer (on file with
the University of the Pacific Law Review) (addressing that the video of Derek Chauvin killing George Floyd’s
immediately generated what may be the largest protest movement in American history).
9. See Karina Zaiets et al., We Looked at Protester Demands From Across the Nation and Compared Them
With Recent Police Reforms, USA TODAY (July 20, 2020), https://www.usatoday.com/indepth/news/2020/07/20/protester-demands-police-policy-change-chokehold-ban/5357153002/ (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review) (showcasing the police reform measures protestors are demanding,
including: banning neck restraints, decreasing police funding, requiring intervention, additional police training or
education, increased reporting, changing protest protocol, and increasing transparency).
10. The Change We Need: 5 Issues that Should Be Part of Efforts to Reform Policing in Local Communities,
ADVANCEMENT PROJECT (Aug. 12, 2020), https://advancementproject.org/the-change-we-need-5-issues-thatshould-be-part-of-efforts-to-reform-policing-in-local-communities/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law
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It is still rare for the criminal justice system to hold police officers accountable for
their use of force.11 The American public has witnessed numerous examples of
officers’ use of excessive force in recent years, often with little to no
accountability.12 As a result, public confidence in law enforcement agencies is at a
record low.13
Following George Floyd’s murder, lawmakers across the country introduced
over 3,000 policing policy bills in response to the public’s push for change.14 In
the California State Legislature, State Senator Sydney Kamlager authored Chapter
20 in an attempt to increase accountability and transparency of officers and police
departments.15 Chapter 20 aims to remove procedural barriers which make it
difficult to arrest police officers.16 Specifically, the bill permits prosecutors to
request an arrest warrant from a magistrate when a police officer is the subject of
the arrest.17 Although Chapter 20 reduces procedural barriers to arresting officers,
it will be ineffective without creating an independent oversight body to eliminate
a prosecutor’s conflict of interest.18

Review).
11. Lydia Wang, Derek Chauvin’s Guilty Verdict is a Step Toward Accountability—But It’s Not Justice,
REFINERY 29 (Apr. 21, 2021), https://www.refinery29.com/en-us/2021/04/10433632/derek-chauvin-guiltyaccountability-justice (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
12.
See 114 Black Men and Boys Killed by Police, NEWSONE (June 3, 2021),
https://newsone.com/playlist/black-men-boy-who-were-killed-by-police/ (on file with the University of the
Pacific Law Review) (reporting 114 Black men that police officers killed in recent years in the United States); see
also Wang, supra note 11 (tallying the 319 people police have killed in the first four months of 2021).
13. Brenan, supra note 5.
14. Noreen O’Donnell & Amy O’Kruk, States Raced to Pass Police Reform Bills After George Floyd’s
Murder. Advocates Say Not Enough, NBC DALL. FORT WORTH (May 25, 2021),
https://www.nbcdfw.com/news/national-international/since-george-floyds-murder-states-have-raced-to-passpolice-reform-bills-but-advocates-say-not-enough/2640889/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law
Review).
15. Bay City News, State Bill Seeks to Increase Police Accountability, NBC BAY AREA (June 29, 2021),
https://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/san-francisco/state-bill-seeks-to-increase-policeaccountability/2582381/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review); David M. Greenwald, Landmark
Police Accountability Bill Signed by Governor Newsom, DAVIS VANGUARD (July 1, 2021),
https://www.davisvanguard.org/2021/07/landmark-police-accountability-bill-signed-by-governor-newsom/ (on
file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
16. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 127, at 3 (Apr. 20, 2021).
17. SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 127, at 5 (June 8, 2021).
18. ASSEMBLY FLOOR, FLOOR ANALYSIS OF AB 127, at 2 (May 3, 2021); see also Thirteen Principles for
Effective Oversight, NAT’L ASS’N CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT L. ENF’T, https://www.nacole.org/principles (last visited
July 18, 2021) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (emphasizing the importance for an
overseeing body to remain independent in order to maintain legitimacy).
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In California, there are multiple ways to arrest an individual.19 American
jurisprudence requires a probable cause standard of proof for any arrest.20 This
standard stems from the Fourth Amendment, requiring officers to show probable
cause to arrest an individual or obtain an arrest warrant.21 In order to demonstrate
probable cause, an officer must reasonably believe the “suspect committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense.”22 In evaluating probable cause, the
court looks to the totality of the circumstances by evaluating all facts available to
the officer at the time of the incident.23 Facts the court may consider include the
level of crime in a specific location, a suspect’s evasive conduct, and other relevant
circumstances.24 Section A discusses circumstances in which an officer may make
a warrantless arrest—as long as they have sufficient probable cause on the scene.25
Section B addresses situations where an officer needs a warrant to make an arrest,
and therefore must first present probable cause to a magistrate.26
A. An Officer May Make an Arrest Without a Warrant in Limited Circumstances
The need for an arrest warrant may depend upon certain circumstances as well
as the practicality of an officer to obtain an arrest warrant.27 Specifically, an officer
must demonstrate that “exigent circumstances” justify the lack of a warrant.28 This
19.
See Stacy Barrett, The Criminal Arrest Process & Your Rights, ALL L.,
https://www.alllaw.com/articles/nolo/criminal/arrest-process-your-rights.html (last visited on July 14, 2021) (on
file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (describing that police officers can arrest a suspect with or
without an arrest warrant); see also Citizen’s Arrest in California – Penal Code 837 PC, SHOUSE CAL. L. GRP.,
https://www.shouselaw.com/ca/defense/penal-code/837/ (last visited July 18, 2021) (on file with the University
of the Pacific Law Review) (identifying that private citizens have the right to arrest).
20.
See
Probable
Cause,
LEGAL
INFOR.
INST.,
CORNELL
L.
SCH.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/probable_cause (last visited July 18, 2021) (on file with the University of the
Pacific Law Review) (“Probable cause is a requirement found in the Fourth Amendment that must usually be met
before police make an arrest.”).
21. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“[N]o warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.”); see also Fourth
Amendment,
LEGAL
INFOR.
INST.,
CORNELL
L.
SCH.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/fourth_amendment (last visited on July 18, 2021) (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining the Fourth Amendment protects citizens against arbitrary
arrests).
22. United States v. Humphries, 372 F.3d 653, 657 (2004); Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979).
23.
See
Arrest
and
Search
Warrants,
MICHAEL
REHM, PERS.
INJ.
ATT’Y,
https://www.michaelrehm.com/california-arrest-search-warrants (last visited on July 12, 2021) (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review) (requiring a magistrate to examine all surrounding circumstances when
applying the totality of the circumstances standard).
24. Humphries, 372 F.3d at 657.
25. Infra Section II.A.
26. Infra Section II.B.
27. When Can Police Arrest a Suspect Without an Arrest Warrant?, MORALES L. FIRM (Jan. 14, 2013),
https://sfcriminallawspecialist.com/blog/when-can-police-arrest-a-suspect-without-an-arrest-warrant/ (on file
with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
28. See CALCRIM No. 2670, JUD. COUNCIL CAL. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS 556 (2020),
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means that an officer must determine if the current circumstances require an
immediate arrest.29 Moreover, the officer’s determination that an immediate arrest
is necessary must be reasonable.30
Similarly, if a suspect’s criminal conduct constitutes a felony, an officer does
not need a warrant to arrest an individual.31 An officer need not personally witness
the felony offense to arrest the suspect.32 That said, an officer must still
demonstrate probable cause when arresting an individual for a felonious offense,
even though an arrest warrant is not required.33 For example, if a police officer has
probable cause to believe a suspect committed a robbery, despite not having
witnessed the crime, there is no need for a warrant.34
The location of a crime and arrest may also determine whether a warrant is
necessary.35 For example, if a crime occurs in the presence of an officer, that officer
may make a warrantless arrest.36 Further, if an officer is arresting a suspect in a
public place, an officer does not need an arrest warrant.37 A warrant is unnecessary
in this situation because a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in a public setting.38 While this section addressed situations where an officer need
not obtain an arrest warrant, there are certain circumstances where an officer must
obtain a warrant.39
B. Situations in Which an Officer Must Obtain an Arrest Warrant
Some situations require an officer to obtain an arrest warrant in order to effect
an arrest.40 An arrest warrant is necessary to arrest a suspect for a misdemeanor
https://www.justia.com/documents/criminal-law-calcrim.pdf (on file with the University of the Pacific Law
Review) (“The term exigent circumstances describes an emergency situation that requires swift action to prevent
(1) imminent danger to life or serious damage to property, or (2) the imminent escape of a suspect or destruction
of evidence.”).
29. Id.
30. Exigent
Circumstances,
LEGAL
INFOR.
INST.,
CORNELL
L.
SCH.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/probable_cause (last visited Sept. 17, 2021) (on file with the University of the
Pacific Law Review).
31. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 836(a)(1) (enacted by 1872 Stat. Ch. 5) (specifying the need for an arrest
warrant is nonexistent when there is probable cause the suspect committed a felony).
32. In re Alonzo C., 87 Cal. App. 3d 707, 712 (1978).
33. CAL. PENAL CODE § 836(a)(1) (enacted by 1872 Stat. Ch. 5)
34. See In re Alonzo C., 87 Cal. App. 3d at 712 (distinguishing between felonies and misdemeanors).
35. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 836(a)(1) (enacted by 1872 Stat. Ch. 5) (outlining the limited circumstances
in which an officer may effect arrest without a warrant).
36. Id.
37. Sam Kamin & Justin Marceau, Double Reasonableness and the 4th Amendment, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV.
589, 598 (2014).
38. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“What a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve
as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”) (citations omitted).
39. Supra Section II.A.; infra Section II.B.
40. What is a Ramey Warrant? How Does it Differ from a Regular Arrest Warrant?, SHOUSE CAL. L. GRP.,
https://www.shouselaw.com/ca/blog/warrant/what-is-a-ramey-warrant-how-does-it-differ-from-a-regular-arrest-

365

2021 / Law Enforcement Allegiance
that the officer did not personally witness.41 The standard determining whether an
officer personally witnesses a crime merely requires an officer to know of the
criminal acts through their own sensory perceptions.42 However, misdemeanor
offenses often do not occur within the officer’s presence, making an arrest warrant
necessary for most misdemeanor offenses.43
Additionally, an officer generally must acquire an arrest warrant in order to
enter a suspect’s dwelling when arresting a suspect at their home.44 However, even
with an arrest warrant, an officer must have knowledge the subject resides at the
specified dwelling.45 Also, the officer must reasonably believe the subject is
currently inside in order to enter.46 These requirements surrounding officers’ entry
into a dwelling stem from the notion that the entry is a limited invasion of one’s
property.47
Prior to Chapter 20, California law required a peace officer to request an arrest
warrant from a magistrate.48 An officer signed a written declaration describing the
facts of the crime and then presented it to a magistrate.49 The declaration needed
to demonstrate probable cause that a crime occurred and the subject of the arrest
warrant was the likely offender.50 If the magistrate found sufficient evidence in the
declaration to show probable cause, the magistrate issued the arrest warrant.51
Officers then had the authority to arrest the suspect for the crime.52 Although
California law empowers an officer to arrest a fellow officer for misconduct, this
rarely happens because officers are reluctant to arrest one of their own.53 The
warrant/ (last visited July 18, 2021) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
41. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 836(a)(1) (enacted by 1872 Stat. Ch. 5) (permitting officers to arrest a suspect
without a warrant if the suspect committed the crime in the officer’s presence).
42. See In re Alonzo C., 87 Cal. App. 3d at 712 (The test is whether the misdemeanor is apparent to the
officer’s senses.) (quotations omitted).
43. Id.
44. See People v. Ramey, 16 Cal. 3d 263, 275 (1976) (“[I]n the absence of a bona fide emergency, or
consent to enter, police action in seizing the individual in the home must be preceded by the judicial authorization
of an arrest warrant.”).
45. People v. Downey, 198 Cal. App. 4th 652, 660 (2011); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603 (1980).
46. Downey, 198 Cal. App. 4th at 660; Payton, 445 U.S. at 603.
47. See People v. LeBlanc, 60 Cal. App. 4th 157, 164 (1997) (reasoning arrest warrants are necessary when
entering dwelling because an arrest warrant permits a peace officer to deprive another of their liberty and
authorizes a limited invasion of an individual’s property).
48. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 817(a)(1) (amended by 2018 Stat. Ch. 176, Sec. 1) (indicating only a peace
officer can make a declaration of probable cause to present to a magistrate); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 830.1(a)
(amended by 2012 Stat. Ch. 66, Sec. 1) (defining a peace officer as any sheriff or police officer employed in that
capacity as well as any “inspector or investigator employed in that capacity in the office of a district attorney”).
49. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 817(b) (amended by 2018 Stat. Ch. 176, Sec. 1) (highlighting the declaration
of probable cause is a sworn written statement and the peace officer can then transmit the affidavit to a magistrate
via facsimile transmission equipment, email, or computer server).
50. CAL. PENAL CODE § 817(a)(1) (amended by 2018 Stat. Ch. 176, Sec. 1).
51. Id.
52. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 817(h) (amended by 2018 Stat. Ch. 176, Sec. 1) (permitting the taking of
defendant into custody after the magistrate issues an arrest warrant).
53. Lovepreet Dhinsa, SF District Attorney Chesa Boudin Applauds CA Assembly OK of Police
Accountability Bill Monday, DAVIS VANGUARD (May 4, 2021), https://www.davisvanguard.org/2021/05/sf-
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underlying purpose of Chapter 20 is to increase accountability by rectifying the
problem of an officer’s hesitancy to report fellow officers.54
III. CHAPTER 20
Chapter 20 aims to eliminate procedural barriers when arresting an officer by
allowing prosecutors to obtain the arrest warrant.55 Chapter 20 creates an
alternative avenue for obtaining an arrest warrant when the subject of the arrest is
an officer, rather than a public citizen.56 This alternative procedure expands who
may sign a declaration of probable cause for an arrest warrant when an officer is
the subject of arrest.57 Under Chapter 20, an employee within a California
prosecutor’s office can sign a declaration of probable cause.58 Therefore, this bill
eliminates the requirement that an officer must sign the declaration.59
A prosecutor must follow the same procedures as a peace officer when making
the declaration of probable cause.60 The prosecutor must present the declaration to
a magistrate.61 The magistrate must then examine the declaration.62 Chapter 20
does not change the existing standard of proof—probable cause—the requesting
party must show.63 If the magistrate is satisfied that probable cause exists, they will
issue the arrest warrant.64 As such, magistrates are still the gatekeepers and
ultimately decide whether to issue the arrest warrant based on the evidence in the
declaration.65
district-attorney-chesa-boudin-applauds-ca-assembly-ok-of-police-accountability-bill-monday/ (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review).
54. See ASSEMBLY FLOOR, FLOOR ANALYSIS OF AB 127, at 2 (May 3, 2021) (“One obstacle to prosecution
of police officers is the unwillingness of law enforcement officers to assist in the prosecution of one of their own.
This can lead to law enforcement officers refusing to provide the necessary information to support an arrest
warrant.”).
55. Id.
56. See AB 127, 2021 Leg., 2021–2022 Sess. (Cal. 2021) (permitting prosecutors to request an arrest
warrant from a magistrate when the subject is a peace officer).
57. Id.; see also Arrest and Search Warrants, supra note 23 (describing probable cause as a showing of
sufficient facts such that a reasonable person would believe that a crime occurred, and the arrestee committed the
crime).
58. AB 127, 2021 Leg., 2021–2022 Sess. (Cal. 2021).
59. Compare id. (showing public prosecutor’s will be able to sign a declaration of probable cause), with
CAL. PENAL CODE § 817(a)(1) (amended by 2018 Stat. Ch. 176, Sec. 1) (requiring a declaration of probable cause
must be made by a California peace officer).
60. Compare AB 127, 2021 Leg., 2021–2022 Sess. (Cal. 2021), with CAL. PENAL CODE § 817(a)(1)
(amended by 2018 Stat. Ch. 176, Sec. 1) (demonstrating that §§ (a)(2)–(i) involves the same process for both
existing law and AB 127).
61. AB 127, 2021 Leg., 2021–2022 Sess. (Cal. 2021).
62. Id.; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 817(g) (amended by 2018 Stat. Ch. 176, Sec. 1) (explaining a magistrate
may examine the individual seeking a warrant under oath, as well as any witnesses).
63. ASSEMBLY FLOOR, FLOOR ANALYSIS OF AB 127, at 2 (May 3, 2021).
64. AB 127, 2021 Leg., 2021–2022 Sess. (Cal. 2021); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 815 (amended by Stat.
Ch. 1490) (outlining the required components of an arrest warrant include the defendant’s name, the issuing city
or county, and the time the warrant is issued).
65. ASSEMBLY FLOOR, FLOOR ANALYSIS OF AB 127, at 2 (May 3, 2021).
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IV. ANALYSIS
State and local governments continue to grapple with ways to enhance police
accountability.66 Chapter 20 aims to hold police accountable by reducing
procedural barriers that exist at the outset of criminal prosecution of police
officers.67 Section A explains how Chapter 20 effectively eliminates one
procedural barrier to arresting an officer by extending the ability to request an
arrest warrant to district attorneys.68 Section B describes how Chapter 20 fails to
address other practical barriers in holding police accountable, such as the strong
relationship between prosecutors and police.69 Section C highlights the need for
independent oversight agencies to effectively hold police officers accountable.70
A. Chapter 20 Successfully Eliminates a Procedural Barrier in Prosecuting
Police Officers
Chapter 20 effectively reduces obstacles to arresting officers because it grants
prosecutors the power to obtain arrest warrants against police officers.71 The arrest
warrant is vital because the arrest is the first step in a criminal prosecution.72 Under
Chapter 20, not only can peace officers request an arrest warrant, but public
prosecutors can as well.73 This broadens who can initiate a criminal prosecution
against an officer.74
Extending the power to obtain an arrest warrant to prosecutors creates
uniformity and acts as a check on police departments.75 Chapter 20 creates
66. See Steve Eder et al., As New Police Reform Laws Sweep Across the U.S., Some Ask: Are They
Enough?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/18/us/police-reform-bills.html (on file
with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (describing the efforts to reform police conduct by states and
lawmakers following George Floyd’s death).
67. See ASSEMBLY FLOOR, FLOOR ANALYSIS OF AB 127, at 2 (May 3, 2021) (indicating the bill’s purpose
is make ease district attorneys in initiating prosecution against an officer by reducing procedural barriers).
68. Infra Section IV.A.
69. Infra Section IV.B.
70. Infra Section IV.C.
71. AB 127, 2021 Leg., 2021–2022 Sess. (Cal. 2021).
72.
How
Criminal
Cases
Work,
California
Courts,
JUD.
BRANCH
CAL.,
https://www.courts.ca.gov/1069.htm?rdeLocaleAttr=en&print=1 (last visited on July 17, 2021) (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review).
73. AB 127, 2021 Leg., 2021–2022 Sess. (Cal. 2021).
74. Compare id. (permitting public prosecutors to sign a declaration of probable cause to request an arrest
warrant), with CAL. PENAL CODE § 817(a)(1) (amended by 2018 Stat. Ch. 176, Sec. 1) (allowing only peace
officers to present probable cause to a magistrate to request an arrest warrant).
75. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 127, at 4–5 (Apr. 20,
2021) (explaining AB 127 would make the requirements to obtain an arrest warrant the same as the requirements
to obtain a search warrant); see also State Senator Sydney K. Kamlager Says California Moves Closer to Police
Officer Accountability with AB 127 Now Heading to Governor’s Desk, SIERRA SUN TIMES (June 12, 2021),
https://goldrushcam.com/sierrasuntimes/index.php/news/local-news/30409-state-senator-sydney-k-kamlagersays-california-moves-closer-to-police-officer-accountability-with-ab-127-now-heading-to-governor-s-desk (on
file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (suggesting AB 127 eliminates procedural barriers currently
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uniformity in that it parallels the procedure for obtaining a search warrant.76
Additionally, uniformity will increase court efficiency because courts will have
one process to follow when issuing warrants—either arrest or search warrants.77
Chapter 20 also creates a check on police power because the ability to arrest no
longer relies solely on fellow police officers.78 Allowing external agencies, such
as district attorney’s offices, to request arrest warrants holds police accountable to
those outside the department.79
Allowing public prosecutors to obtain arrest warrants eliminates the need for
officers to report fellow officers, thus easing the ability to arrest police officers for
misconduct.80 Before Chapter 20, a fellow officer would need to obtain an arrest
warrant against the offender, making it difficult to arrest officers.81 Officers are
often reluctant to report other officers and hesitant to assist in the prosecution of
one of their own.82 With Chapter 20, a prosecutor can now present probable cause
to a magistrate, eliminating the need for a police officer to speak out against
another officer.83 Despite this bill’s elimination of prosecutorial barriers by
expanding who can acquire an arrest warrant for an officer, further improvements
are still necessary for adequate police accountability.84

in place that shield law enforcement officers from accountability by no longer requiring officers to sign off on
arrest warrants).
76. See ASSEMBLY FLOOR, FLOOR ANALYSIS OF AB 127, at 1 (May 3, 2021) (highlighting peace officers
are not required to sign off search warrants even though the examination procedures and standard to obtain a
search warrant is the same as an arrest warrant).
77. See id. (indicating how the process will be similar to the process of obtaining a search warrant).
78. See Sydney K. Kamlager, Governor Newsom Signs Landmark Legislation to Improve Police Officer
Accountability Into Law, SYDNEY K. KAMLAGER REPRESENTING SENATE DIST. 30: PRESS RELEASES (June 29,
2021), https://sd30.senate.ca.gov/news/governor-newsom-signs-landmark-legislation-improve-police-officeraccountability-law (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (“AB 127: Arrest Warrants: Declaration
of Probable Cause will allow a prosecutor’s office to go directly to the judge in securing an arrest warrant when
the subject is a peace officer.”).
79. See Rachel Marshall, San Francisco District Attorney Chesa Boudin Praises Senate’s Passage of AB
127, Which He Cosponsored, and Urges Governor Newsom To Sign It into Law, S.F. DISTRICT ATT’Y: PRESS
RELEASES (June 11, 2021), https://sfdistrictattorney.org/press-release/district-attorney-chesa-boudin-praisessenates-passage-of-ab-127/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (quoting ACLU police
practices expert, John Crew, explaining the importance of policy changes enabling prosecutors to file charges
against officers who break the law).
80. Dhinsa, supra note 53.
81. See id. (emphasizing police officers are often reluctant to assist in the arrest of one of their own).
82. Id.; SENATE FLOOR, SENATE FLOOR ANALYSIS OF AB 127, at 5 (June 9, 2021).
83. See Paige Laver, Chesa Boudin-Backed Assembly Bill 127 to Hold Police Accountable Signed into
Law, DAVIS VANGUARD (July 3, 2021), https://www.davisvanguard.org/2021/07/chesa-boudin-backedassembly-bill-127-to-hold-police-accountable-signed-into-law/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law
Review) (stating AB 127 will diversify who can present evidence of probable cause to a magistrate when
requesting an arrest warrant).
84. See id. (referencing that both author of AB 127—Senator Sydney Kamlager—and the co–sponsor of
the bill—San Francisco District Attorney Chesa Boudin—believe this bill will increase police accountability by
eliminating procedural barriers to obtaining arrest warrants when the subject of arrest is a peace officer); AB 127,
2021 Leg., 2021–2022 Sess. (Cal. 2021).
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B. Chapter 20 is Likely Not an Adequate Solution to Increase Police
Accountability
California Senator Sydney Kamlager introduced Chapter 20 intending to hold
police accountable for misconduct.85 While the bill successfully eliminates one
procedural barrier to initiating an arrest of a peace officer, the bill is not enough to
create greater police accountability.86 Chapter 20 fails to consider other key
barriers to holding officers accountable and therefore is not an adequate solution.87
Subsection 1 discusses how Chapter 20 does not address the interdependent
relationship between police departments and public prosecutors, therefore creating
a conflict of interest.88 Subsection 2 addresses how this conflict of interest results
in a lack of accountability and transparency to the public.89
1. Chapter 20 Fails to Consider the Relationship Between District Attorneys
and the Police
Police and prosecutors work together every day and must cooperate to
successfully perform their jobs.90 Police assist district attorneys in gathering the
evidence prosecutors use to build and prove their case.91 Prosecutors must have all
relevant facts for a case in order to demonstrate a defendant committed the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt come trial.92 To meet this high burden of proof,
prosecutors need police officers who often have the most relevant information
about the events of a crime.93 Prosecutors cannot do their job without police, thus

85. ASSEMBLY FLOOR, ASSEMBLY FLOOR ANALYSIS OF AB 127, at 2 (May 3, 2021).
86. Supra Section IV.A; infra Section IV.B.
87. Infra Section IV.B.
88. Infra Subsection IV.B.1.
89. Infra Subsection IV.B.2.
90. Important Relationships for Prosecutors, CLIFFNOTES, https://www.cliffsnotes.com/studyguides/criminal-justice/prosecutors/important-relationships-for-prosecutors (last visited on July 17, 2021) (on file
with the University of the Pacific Law Review); Jon Swaine, et. al., Ties That Bind: How the Bond Between Police
and Prosecutors Impedes Justice, GUARDIAN (Dec. 31, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2015/dec/31/ties-that-bind-conflicts-of-interest-police-killings (on file with the University of the Pacific
Law Review).
91. See Martin Kaste, It’s A Complicated Relationship Between Prosecutors, Police, NPR (Dec. 4, 2014),
https://www.npr.org/2014/12/04/368529402/its-a-complicated-relationship-between-prosecutors-police (on file
with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (“[P]rosecutors need the police on their side. They rely on the
police to investigate cases and testify at trials.”).
92. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 36 (1970) (expressing the government must prove a defendant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt); see also CALCRIM No. 220, JUD. COUNCIL CAL. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS 43
(2020), https://www.justia.com/documents/criminal-law-calcrim.pdf (on file with the University of the Pacific
Law Review) (“Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you with an abiding conviction that the
charge is true.”).
93. See Alexandra Hodson, The American Injustice System: The Inherent Conflict of Interest in PoliceProsecutor Relationships & How Immunity Lets Them ‘Get Away with Murder’, 54 IDAHO L. REV. 563, 584
(2018) (noting a detective’s ability to possess in–depth and current information which can help a prosecutor with
their case).
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creating a strong relationship and a sense of dependency.94 Prosecutors typically
cannot so much as bring charges against an individual, let alone reach a conviction,
without relying on police reports.95 Therefore, prosecutors’ success in court
depends on diligent police efforts.96
Additionally, as elected officials, elected district attorneys depend heavily on
police organizations and unions for campaign support.97 Police contribute
substantially to district attorneys’ election campaigns.98 For example, in the most
recent Los Angeles County District Attorney election, police unions donated to the
incumbent, totaling seventy-two percent of her total campaign donations.99 This
interdependency renders Chapter 20 ineffective because it creates the same conflict
of interest the bill aims to eliminate.100
2. Prosecutors’ Inherent Conflict of Interest Will Likely Result in Little
Police Accountability and Transparency
District attorneys and police departments have a symbiotic relationship, thus
creating an evident conflict of interest.101 The strong affiliation between
prosecutors and police agencies can lead to a prosecutor’s reluctance in seeking an
arrest warrant against an officer.102 Despite working in different branches of law
enforcement, prosecutors—like officers—may not want to speak out against police
due to this conflict of interest.103 Therefore, Chapter 20 falsely assumes that district
94.
Local
Criminal
Prosecution,
HUMAN
RIGHTS
WATCH,
https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports98/police/uspo31.htm (last visited July 18, 2021) (on file with the University
of the Pacific Law Review); see also Kate Levine, Who Shouldn’t Prosecute the Police, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1447,
1450 (2016) (“Maintaining a good relationship with individual officers and the good will of a police department
is essential to a prosecutor’s success in obtaining convictions, and thus to her professional life.”).
95. See Paul Bergman, How the Prosecutor Decides Which Cases to Charge, NOLO,
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/how-prosecutors-decide-which-cases-charge.html (last visited on July
18, 2021) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (detailing the process in which prosecutors make
charging decisions often relies on police reports); ASSEMBLY FLOOR, FLOOR ANALYSIS OF AB 127, at 2 (May 3,
2021).
96. See Bergman, supra note 96 (denoting the various ways police reports can impact a prosecutor’s case,
such as influencing what charges to file, the bail amount, preliminary hearing outcomes, plea bargains, and even
tactics at trial).
97. See Swaine, et al., supra note 91 (illustrating police unions frequently donate to district attorney
campaigns).
98. See id. (“Among the 95% of district attorneys who are elected, many . . . . . .receive valuable donations
and public endorsements from police unions for their campaigns.”).
99. Maloy Moore et al., Here are the Mega-Donors and Police Unions Pouring Millions into the L.A.
County District Attorney Race, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/projects/la-district-attorneyrace-top-donors/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
100. See ASSEMBLY FLOOR, FLOOR ANALYSIS OF AB 127, at 2 (May 3, 2021) (declaring the obstacle AB
127 eliminates is that members of law enforcement do not want to help prosecute one of their own).
101. Irene Oritseweyinmi Joe, The Prosecutor’s Client Problem, 98 B.U. L. REV. 885, 899 (2018).
102. See Swaine, et al., supra note 91 (“Prosecutors work with police day in, day out, and typically they’re
reluctant to criticize them or investigate them.”).
103. See German Lopez, Police Officers are Prosecuted for Murder in Less Than 2 Percent of Fatal
Shootings, VOX (Apr. 2, 2021), https://www.vox.com/21497089/derek-chauvin-george-floyd-trial-police-
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attorneys will willingly seek arrest warrants against police simply because the bill
empowers prosecutors to do so.104
If prosecutors are unlikely to pursue arrest warrants against police officers,
police departments will remain unchecked.105 Consequently, the current lack of
police accountability will likely continue.106 Currently, police are self-regulated
entities, accountable only to themselves.107 This self-regulation permits police
departments to avoid transparency with the public, contributing further to the lack
of police accountability.108 Because Chapter 20 only permits prosecutors—another
law enforcement agency—to hold officers accountable, minimal police
accountability will continue.109 The bill does not adequately eliminate the barrier
to obtaining an arrest warrant against a police officer because prosecutors, like
officers, have a strong conflict of interest.110 To truly eliminate this procedural
barrier and increase accountability, independent entities must be able to check law

prosecutions-black-lives-matter (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (identifying the “blue wall
of silence” as the reason officers have a code not to snitch on each other); see also About Government, OFF. ATT’Y
GEN., STATE CAL. DEP’T JUST., https://oag.ca.gov/government/about (last visited on July 18, 2021) (on file with
the University of the Pacific Law Review) (recognizing district attorney’s offices as a branch of law enforcement).
104. See AB 127, 2021 Leg., 2021–2022 Sess. (Cal. 2021) (expanding the power to request an arrest
warrant to employees in a public prosecutor’s office, instead of just peace officers).
105. See Antony Davies & James R. Harrigan, How to Hold Police Accountable, U.S. NEWS (Sept. 7,
2017), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/civil-wars/articles/2017-09-07/how-to-hold-police-accountable-to-thepublic (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (implying that police are not held accountable
because very little actually limits police authority).
106. See id. (suggesting police agencies’ powers are not limited or checked by external entities).
107. Max Felker-Kantor, Police Departments Should No Longer be Allowed to Police Themselves, WASH.
POST (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2018/03/19/policedepartments-should-no-longer-be-allowed-to-police-themselves/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law
Review); The Relationship Between Prosecutors and Police: Promoting Accountability and Building Public Trust,
NAACP LEGAL DEF. FUND, VOTING FOR JUST. B1 (2020), https://votingforjustice.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/10/B_LDF_09282020_VFJToolkit_PromotingAccountability-w_finished-endnotes-1.pdf
(on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
108. See Mike Savino, Police Accountability is Impossible Without Transparency, CT MIRROR (June 4,
2020), https://ctmirror.org/category/ct-viewpoints/police-accountability-is-impossible-without-transparency/ (on
file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (“[A]ccountability is nearly impossible without transparency,
and too often police are able to block public access to information.”).
109. See The Relationship Between Prosecutors and Police: Promoting Accountability and Building Public
Trust,
supra
note
108,
at
B1–B2,
https://votingforjustice.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/10/B_LDF_09282020_VFJToolkit_PromotingAccountability-w_finished-endnotes-1.pdf
(on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (acknowledging that district attorneys often oppose reform
attempts and legislation that will increase police accountability and transparency).
110. See David M. Greenwald, Landmark Police Accountability Bill Signed by Governor Newsom, DAVIS
VANGUARD (July 1, 2021), https://www.davisvanguard.org/2021/07/landmark-police-accountability-bill-signedby-governor-newsom/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (addressing the intent behind AB
127 is to ease the process of securing an arrest warrant for an officer by extending that power to prosecutors); see
also Hodson, supra note 94, at 584 (stating an inherent conflict exists in officer–prosecutor relationships).
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enforcement.111 Independent agencies with the ability to check police departments
will ensure that these departments do not become too powerful.112
C. Chapter 20 Must Include the Implementation of Independent Oversight of
Police Agencies
Implementing independent oversight of police conduct must occur in tandem
with Chapter 20.113 Without this addition, police are still not accountable to anyone
outside law enforcement.114 Subsection 1 describes the need for independent
oversight bodies to increase police accountability.115 Subsection 2 examines
current examples of oversight bodies.116 Subsection 3 discusses how oversight
committees with proper authority can result in greater police accountability.117
1. The Need for Independent Oversight for Better Police Accountability
Engaging in little oversight of police, the criminal justice system rarely holds
police officers accountable for their misconduct.118 Chapter 20 does not increase
the level of oversight as it only expands the power to acquire an arrest warrant to
another branch within law enforcement.119 An independent oversight body is a
viable solution to hold police accountable.120 Independent bodies will likely hold
111. See Masha Lisitsyna & Ian Scott, How Independent Agencies Can Begin to Hold Police Accountable,
OPEN SOC’Y JUST. INITIATIVE (May 10, 2021), https://www.justiceinitiative.org/voices/how-independentagencies-can-begin-to-hold-police-accountable (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review)
(“Independence is the oxygen of a credible investigative agency.”).
112. See id. (explaining that police departments currently police themselves which does not result in
accountability); see also Separation of Powers, LEGAL INFOR. INST., CORNELL L. SCH.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/separation_of_powers_0 (last visited Aug. 27, 2021) (“The Checks and
Balances system provides each branch of government with individual powers to check the other branches and
prevent any one branch from becoming too powerful.”).
113. See Lisitsyna & Scott, supra note 112 (recognizing independence as a necessary characteristic of any
investigative agency).
114. See Felker-Kantor, supra note 108 (“Without a fundamental rethinking of internal disciplinary
procedures and the political structures of power that leave police departments with autonomous authority to police
their own, continued revelations about departments that leave officers with a history of abusive or violent behavior
on the street should not be surprising.”).
115. Infra Subsection IV.C.1.
116. Infra Subsection IV.C.2.
117. Infra Subsection IV.C.3.
118. See Sean Collins, How the Federal Government Could Improve Police Oversight, VOX (Mar. 24,
2021),
https://www.vox.com/22295749/policing-reform-federal-oversight-voting-rights-act-mazzone-rushin
https://www.vox.com/22295749/policing-reform-federal-oversight-voting-rights-act-mazzone-rushin (on file
with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (indicating that many police departments in the United States have
little oversight).
119. See AB 127, 2021 Leg., 2021–2022 Sess. (Cal. 2021) (expanding the power to present probable cause
to a magistrate to acquire an arrest warrant to public prosecutor offices); see also About Government, supra note
104 (recognizing district attorney offices as a branch of law enforcement).
120. See Seth W. Stoughton et al., How to Actually Fix America’s Police, ATLANTIC (June 3, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/06/how-actually-fix-americas-police/612520/ (on file with the
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police accountable because these bodies will be entirely separate entities from law
enforcement that will have the power to oversee police agencies.121
The element of independence is vital because it eliminates the police’s power
to self-regulate.122 Across the nation, self-regulated police departments are not only
refusing to discipline their own officers in instances of misconduct, but are also
allowing these officers to remain employed.123 For example, the New York Police
Department hid “probation files” for officers who had committed serious offenses
yet kept their jobs.124 In Philadelphia, police departments have a list of officers the
department has disciplined; however, these officers are still employed and
collecting a salary.125 Police agencies demonstrated that they allow offending
officers to continue their jobs and may even help keep the misconduct out of the
public eye.126 As such, completely independent bodies must oversee police
agencies to hold offending officers accountable.127
2. Current Oversight Boards Across the United States Do Not Have the
Necessary Resources to be Effective
Three different models for oversight boards gained momentum due to society’s
growing calls for police accountability in instances of misconduct.128 In the
investigation model, oversight boards are independent of law enforcement,
consisting of professional, non-police investigators.129 However, the investigation
model is costly, difficult to operate, and police unions strongly oppose this
model.130 The review model consists of volunteers who retroactively review
completed investigations and then provide recommendations to leaders within
police departments.131 While the volunteer staff has limited resources and power,

University of the Pacific Law Review) (emphasizing the importance of external oversight to enforce best policies
and training).
121. See Lisitsyna & Scott, supra note 112 (indicating independence as a key component for a successful
oversight body).
122. Id.
123. Felker-Kantor, supra note 108.
124. Id.
125. Chris Palmer et al., Behind DA’s List of Suspect Cops: A Controversial Police Discipline System,
PHILA. INQUIRER (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/breaking/do-not-call-list-da-krasnerphiladelphia-police-20180308.html (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
126. Felker-Kantor, supra note 108.
127. Lisitsyna & Scott, supra note 112.
128. See Michael De Bonis, Civilian Review Boards Gain Popularity Among Police Reformers. How
Effective Are They?, WOSU PUB. MEDIA (June 24, 2020), https://news.wosu.org/news/2020-06-24/civilianreview-boards-gain-popularity-among-police-reformers-how-effective-are-they (on file with the University of the
Pacific Law Review) (discussing three proposed models for oversight boards—the review model, the investigation
model, and the auditor model—each with pros and cons).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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it has successfully generated greater public trust in law enforcement.132 This
increase in public trust stems from the staff’s ability to illuminate community
concerns.133 The final type of review board is the auditor board, which can
effectively change police departments because it examines broad policies and
patterns within a law enforcement agency.134
Existing review boards face challenges in effectively reducing instances of
police misconduct.135 Some civilian review boards (“CRB”) have been
unsuccessful as they face barriers to obtaining information from police
departments.136 In some instances, police unions have strongly opposed CRBs that
have too much investigative authority.137 Limited access to funding is another
obstacle influencing the effectiveness of a CRB.138 The less funding a CRB
receives, the less likely it will effectively increase police accountability.139
Further, some independent review boards are ineffective because they lose
their ability to effectively hold police agencies accountable.140 For example, some
CRBs are unsuccessful because they become “vulnerable to local political
manipulation.”141 Additionally, some boards are less effective because they are not
truly independent.142 Former police officers sometimes serve on these boards, thus
perpetuating the conflict of interest.143 Ultimately, while CRBs have attempted to

132. Id.
133. De Bonis, supra note 129.
134. See id. (establishing the auditor agency as highly effective because “[t]hey have a free license to
investigate anything”).
135. See Marlene Lenthang, Police Oversight Boards are Proliferating, but Do They Actually Work?, ABC
NEWS
(June
4,
2021),
https://abcnews.go.com/US/police-oversight-boards-proliferatingwork/story?id=77919091 (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (asserting that civilian oversight
boards must be empowered with proper resources in order to contribute to police reform).
136. See id. (showing the civilian oversight group in the Breonna Taylor case was unsuccessful because
they did not have the authority to investigate).
137. See Kelly McConney Moore, For Civilian Review Boards to Work, They Must Avoid Past Mistakes,
ACLU CONN. (Sept. 10, 2020), https://www.acluct.org/en/news/civilian-review-boards-work-they-must-avoidpast-mistakes (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (demonstrating police unions strongly
opposed a Connecticut bill that allowed CRBs to have the power to subpoena).
138. Do Police Oversight Boards Work?, AM. POLICE OFFICERS ALL. (Dec. 5, 2019),
https://americanpoliceofficersalliance.com/do-police-oversight-boards-work/ (on file with the University of the
Pacific Law Review); see also Peter Finn, Citizen Review of Police: Approaches and Implementation, NAT’L INST.
JUST. 128 (2001), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/184430.pdf (on file with the University of the Pacific Law
Review) (“In most organizations, there is a relationship between expenditures and results—that is, the more money
spent, the more or better the results.”).
139. See Finn, supra note 139 (suggesting that oversight bodies with greater funding and spending have
better results).
140. See Priyanka Boghani, Is Civilian Oversight the Answer to Distrust of Police?, FRONTLINE PBS (July
13, 2016), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/is-civilian-oversight-the-answer-to-distrust-of-police/ (on
file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing that some oversight boards are less effective
because they lack authority to carry out their own investigations, subpoena officers, and do not have adequate
staffing).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See id. (“Some boards . . . can be staffed with current or former police officers.”).
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address police misconduct, they have lacked the necessary powers and resources
to effectively do so.144
3. An Independent Oversight Body with Proper Authority Will Increase
Police Accountability
An independent body requires the proper authority to effect change and
provide proper oversight of police departments.145 One necessary element is the
power to access officer misconduct records.146 Although police records are
necessary for oversight bodies to conduct thorough investigations, these bodies
often encounter difficulties in accessing such records.147 Oversight bodies should
have the power to access records directly or through the subpoena power to
properly oversee police departments.148
Oversight agencies must also have the power to discipline police.149 By
empowering oversight boards with the power to discipline police agencies, the
disciplinary process will become external from the police department.150 One of
the key obstacles to officer accountability is that departments often do not
discipline officers for misconduct.151 By allowing external bodies to discipline
officers, more officers will likely face disciplinary action and possible
termination.152

144. See Moore, supra note 138 (suggesting CRBs face barriers, making it difficult for the boards to
generate successful oversight, thus making them appear to be ineffective).
145. See De Bonis, supra note 129 (“The more authority the board has, the better they will be able to
provide appropriate oversight of the police.”); see also Lenthang, supra note 136 (“[E]ssential elements for
effective oversight include civilian leadership, a sufficient budget, the power to conduct investigations into
officers, direct access to police files, the power to subpoena records and the power to discipline officers.”).
146. See Finn, supra note 139 (pointing to police departments’ refusal to share records as a common
concern for oversight bodies).
147. See Lenthang, supra note 136 (noting the challenges independent oversight bodies face when
attempting to access police records).
148. Brett Raffish, Civilian Oversight as a Police Accountability Mechanism, LAWFARE (Feb. 17, 2021),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/civilian-oversight-police-accountability-mechanism (on file with the University of
the Pacific Law Review); see also De Bonis, supra note 129 (discussing various oversight bodies’ authority to
subpoena has led to success).
149. See De Bonis, supra note 129 (claiming successful oversight groups have the authority to discipline).
150. Tatiana Follett et al., Law Enforcement Certification and Discipline, NAT’L CONF. STATE
LEGISLATURES (Aug. 17, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/policing-oversight-andnew-legislation.aspx (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
151. Felker-Kantor, supra note 108.
152. See id. (stating that police departments rarely discipline their own officers).
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An oversight body also requires proper funding in order to effect change.153
Without proper funding, the board would likely consist of volunteers.154 As such,
members of the board lack the necessary expertise to adequately oversee police
agencies.155 However, with proper funding, these boards will be able to pay for
professional staff that will be able to devote the necessary time to engage in proper
oversight.156 For an oversight body to truly be successful, sufficient funding is
necessary.157
Another necessary requirement for oversight bodies is that they must be
independent from law enforcement.158 An oversight body empowered with proper
authority will increase accountability and transparency of police departments
because the departments will be subject to independent review.159 Currently,
Chapter 20 retains the power to arrest police officers within law enforcement, and
therefore the review is not independent.160 As such, the bill does little to encourage
impartiality.161 Accordingly, an independent review body needs to be part of the
solution to truly hold police accountable.162
With the proper authority, an oversight body can operate without any
dependence upon law enforcement agencies.163 An independent oversight body
specializing in police conduct would ensure checks on police departments come
from outside law enforcement, thus increasing police accountability.164
Accordingly, an independent and impartial oversight body, empowered to
investigate and discipline police departments, will restore the public’s trust in law

153. Do Police Oversight Boards Work?, supra note 139; see also Joseph De Angelis et al., Civilian
Oversight of Law Enforcement: A Review of the Strengths and Weaknesses of Various Models, OFF. JUST.
PROGRAMS,
NAT’L
ASS’N
CIVILIAN
OVERSIGHT
L.
ENF’T
11
(2016),
https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/nacole/pages/161/attachments/original/1481727977/NACOLE_short_do
c_FINAL.pdf?1481727977 (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (suggesting oversight bodies
with volunteers, instead of paid staff, may have less expertise therefore leading to possible inefficiency).
154. Moore, supra note 138; De Bonis, supra note 129.
155. De Angelis et al., supra note 154.
156. Id.
157. See Finn, supra note 139 (showing a correlation between the amount of funding an oversight body
receives and the body’s ability to be effective).
158. See Lisitsyna & Scott, supra note 112 (claiming independence is a necessary element for oversight
agencies).
159. See Olugbenga Ajilore, Are Civilian Oversight Agencies Actually Holding Police Accountable?,
URBAN WIRE (July 19, 2018), https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/are-civilian-oversight-agencies-actuallyholding-police-accountable (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining greater trust exists
when oversight agencies are independent from police).
160. See AB 127, 2021 Leg., 2021–2022 Sess. (Cal. 2021) (extending the power to request arrest warrants
to public prosecutors who are members of law enforcement).
161. Levine, supra note 95, at 1450.
162. Ajilore, supra note 160.
163. See Lenthang, supra note 136 (discussing the importance for an oversight body to have the ability to
conduct investigations of officers without relying on the police agency).
164. CAL. PENAL CODE § 817(a)(1) (amended by 2018 Stat. Ch. 176, Sec. 1); see also Levine, supra note
95, at 1450 (declaring the prosecutor–police relationship creates such a conflict of interest that it could threaten
prosecutorial legitimacy).
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enforcement.165 Moreover, an independent oversight body will do what Chapter 20
intended to do—hold police accountable in cases of officer misconduct.166
V. CONCLUSION
Americans have witnessed numerous displays of police misconduct and
excessive uses of force.167 George Floyd’s murder was just one example, yet it
sparked public protests around the world.168 These mass protests called for
change.169 Senator Kamlager authored Chapter 20 to increase police
accountability.170 Prior to the bill, California law only permitted peace officers to
request an arrest warrant from a magistrate.171 This restriction meant officers
would need to speak out against fellow officers, thus creating limited
accountability of police officers.172
Chapter 20 extends the ability to request an arrest warrant to prosecutors,
specifically when the subject of the arrest is a police officer.173 The bill aims to
eliminate the procedural barriers that exist in arresting an officer for misconduct. 174
Current California law only permits peace officers to request arrest warrants.175 As
such, a lack of police accountability exists because officers are often unwilling to
speak out against fellow officers.176
On its own, Chapter 20 is an insufficient solution to increasing police
accountability as it still limits the power to request an arrest warrant to law
enforcement agencies.177 Although permitting prosecutors to request arrest

165. Boghani, supra note 141; Lenthang, supra note 136.
166. See ASSEMBLY FLOOR, FLOOR ANALYSIS OF AB 127, at 1 (May 3, 2021) (stating AB 127’s intends
to ease the challenges prosecutors face when charging police officers).
167.
See 114 Black Men and Boys Killed by Police, NEWSONE (June 3, 2021),
https://newsone.com/playlist/black-men-boy-who-were-killed-by-police/ (on file with the University of the
Pacific Law Review) (discussing the 114 Black men and boys that police have killed in recent years).
168. Jason Silverstein, The Global Impact of George Floyd: How Black Lives Matter Protests Shaped
Movements Around the World, CBS NEWS (June 4, 2021), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/george-floyd-blacklives-matter-impact/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
169. Helier Cheung, George Floyd Death: Why US Protests Are so Powerful This Time, BBC NEWS (June
8, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-52969905 on file with the University of the Pacific Law
Review).
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warrants is a beneficial step, a conflict of interest will still exist.178 The fact that
police agencies are neither accountable to, nor transparent with, the public
exacerbates this conflict of interest.179 Chapter 20 alone does not rectify the issue
of accountability.180
Independent oversight bodies will hold police accountable and ensure they are
more transparent to the communities they serve.181 Greater accountability and
transparency will ultimately increase public trust in law enforcement.182 If given
the power to oversee police departments, these bodies can help alleviate the tension
between police and the public.183 The addition of independent oversight bodies will
aid Chapter 20 in achieving its goal of increasing police accountability and
transparency.184

178. ASSEMBLY FLOOR, FLOOR ANALYSIS OF AB 127, at 1 (May 3, 2021); Levine, supra note 95, at 1450;
see Joe, supra note 102, at 899 (discussing the symbiotic relationship between police and prosecutors).
179. See Felker-Kantor, supra note 108 (implying the lack of accountability and transparency is because
police “are left to police themselves”).
180. Supra Section IV.C.
181. See Boghani, supra note 141 (“Civilian oversight . . . can help hold police accountable and develop
trust with local residents.”).
182. See Barbara Attard, Oversight of Law Enforcement is Beneficial and Needed—Both Inside and Out,
30 PACE L. REV. 1548, 1554–1555 (2010) (“[A]llowing independent oversight and community access to this
information leads to increased confidence in the process and the law enforcement organization.”).
183. See Leica Kwong, Increasing Police Accountability and Improving Use of Force Policies in the
United States, THEMIS RSCH. J. JUST. STUD. FORENSIC SCI. 164, 164–65 (2018) (implying a positive relationship
between police and the public exists when there is more transparency and less division between the two).
184. Supra Section IV.C; see also ASSEMBLY FLOOR, FLOOR ANALYSIS OF AB 127, at 2 (May 3, 2021)
(emphasizing AB 127’s purpose to eliminate barriers to police accountability).
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